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•  Those acquiring contaminated land and wanting to (or
forced to) clean it up apparently must capitalize remediation
costs.
•  Transfers of ownership in less than arm's length
transactions, particularly where the consideration is
nominal, are unlikely to affect deductibility.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
CLAIMS. The debtor had granted to a lender a security
interest in a tractor truck used in the debtor’s business. The
debtor filed for Chapter 13 and the plan provided for the
debtor’s retention of the truck for use in the business and for
payment of the loan secured by the truck in the amount
equal to the wholesale value of the truck on the date of the
petition, using the cramdown provision of Section
1325(a)(5)(B). The lender argued that, under Section 506(a),
the secured amount of the claim was equal to the
replacement value of the truck at its full retail value. The
debtor presented credible expert testimony as to the
wholesale value of the truck and the lender provided weak
expert testimony as to the retail value of the truck. The
Court held that the amount of the secured portion of the
claim was limited to the wholesale value of the truck as
determined by the debtor’s expert testimony. Matter of
Rash, 90 F.3d 1036 (5th Cir. 1996).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AUTOMATIC STAY. The IRS filed a claim for unpaid
income taxes, penalties and interest and unpaid employment
taxes, penalties and interest. Prior to the filing for
bankruptcy, the IRS had filed a notice of levy against the
debtors’ real property which was subject to an Illinois land
trust. The notice was not filed with the trustee. After the
bankruptcy filing, the IRS erroneously filed a duplicate
notice of levy and sent the debtors a notice of audit of
employment taxes for pre-bankruptcy tax years. The IRS
later rescinded the duplicate notice of levy. The debtors first
argued that the duplicate levy notice and audit notice
violated the automatic stay, but the court held that the
rescission of the duplicate notice removed any violation and
that an audit notice was not a violation of the automatic
stay. The debtors also argued that the rescission of the
duplicate notice caused the initial levy to be rescinded
because the second notice merged with the first. The court
held that this argument failed because the debtors failed to
provide any support for the merger theory in statute or case
law. The debtors also argued that the assessed penalties and
interest should have been abated because the debtors’ failure
to pay the taxes resulted from the high medical bills for their
disabled child. The court held that the debtors had sufficient
means to either pay the taxes from income or by borrowing
the money against their substantial equity in the debtors’
home. Carlson v. U.S., 198 B.R. 949 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
DISCHARGE. The IRS filed a claim for 1986, 1987
and 1988 taxes owed by the debtors. The taxes were due
more than three years before the bankruptcy petition was
filed. The 1986 and 1987 taxes were assessed more than 240
days before the petition but the 1988 taxes were assessed
151 days before the petition. The debtors received a
discharge in the case but, after the discharge, the IRS
continued to seek payment of the taxes through levies, even
after letters from the debtors were sent reminding the IRS of
the discharge. The IRS argued that the three year period
should have been equitably waived by the court but did not
provide any reason for the equitable waiver. The court held
that the IRS’s failure to seek the equitable waiver before
violating the automatic stay of the discharge prohibited
applying equitable principles to the IRS’s claims. Therefore,
the court ruled that the IRS could continue assessments and
collection only as to the 1988 taxes which were not
discharged. In re Gilmore, 198 B.R. 686 (Bankr. E.D.
Tex. 1996).
DISMISSAL. The debtor filed for Chapter 11 with
primarily federal income tax debts as claims in the case. The
court found that the debtor failed to file the Chapter 11
operating reports in contravention of court orders, filed
incorrect and misleading information with the court, and
failed to file and pay post-petition income taxes. The court
held that the debtor’s actions demonstrated bad faith
sufficient to warrant dismissal of the case. Matter of
Whitehurst, 198 B.R. 981 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996).
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EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT. The debtors filed
for Chapter 7 on December 19, 1995. During the bankruptcy
case, the debtors received an income tax refund for 1995
which resulted from an earned income tax credit. The court
held that the refund was estate property. The debtors
claimed the refund as an exemption under the Oklahoma
exemption for “alimony, support, separate maintenance or
child support payments.” Okla. Stat. tit. 31, § 1(19). The
court held that the refund was eligible for the exemption
because the earned income tax credit was intended to
provide support for low income workers with children. In re
George, 199 B.R. 60 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1996).
NET OPERATING LOSSES. The debtors had filed for
Chapter 7 in 1982. The bankruptcy trustee filed bankruptcy
estate income tax returns, and the 1989 return showed a
final net operating loss resulting from losses in 1981
through 1984. After the bankruptcy case ended in 1991, the
debtors filed amended individual returns for 1986 through
1989 claiming deductions for the net operating losses
remaining from the bankruptcy estate. The IRS denied the
requested refunds for 1986 and 1987 as untimely filed. The
debtors acknowledged that, under I.R.C. § 6511(a), the
refund claims were not timely filed because the refund
claims were filed more than two years after the taxes was
paid. The debtors argued that 11 U.S.C. § 346(i)(2) allowed
use of any remaining tax attributes as though any time
limitations were suspended during the bankruptcy case. The
court held that Section 346(a) made Section 346(i)(2)
subject to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; therefore, the
two year limitation period for filing a refund was not
suspended by the bankruptcy filing. The IRS denied the
refund claims for 1988 and 1989 because the remaining net
operating losses were not reduced by the amount of
indebtedness discharged in the bankruptcy case as required
by I.R.C. § 108. Apparently, the bankruptcy trustee failed to
offset the net operating losses against the discharged
indebtedness on the final return. The debtors argued that the
final return was entitled to a presumption of correctness
because the IRS did not object to the return. The court held
that the failure of the trustee to properly complete the return
did not excuse the debtors from complying with I.R.C. §
108; therefore, because the amount of discharged
indebtedness exceeded the net operating losses, the debtors
were not entitled to any refund. Firsdon v. United States,
96-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,475 (6th Cir. 1996), aff’g,
95-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,040 (N.D. Ohio 1995).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
CONSERVATION. The USDA has issued interim final
regulations (effective immediately but may be amended
later after public comments) implementing changes to the
Highly Erodible Land and Wetland Conservation program.
The amendments include: (1) adding factors for allowing a
variance for weather, pest or disease problems; (2)
providing that highly erodible land which is combined with
another parcel must retain its highly erodible character; (3)
requiring that a conservation system be evaluated according
to the NRCS field office technical guide; (4) requiring that
conservation field trials have prior approval from the NRCS
and be documented in the conservation plan; (5) adding
factors for use by the FSA state committee for granting
relief based on economic hardship in implementing a
conservation system; (6) adding additional, more precise
definitions of wetlands; and (7) providing that in making a
determination of good faith compliance, the USDA may
consider any other violations of federal, state or local
conservation provisions. The USDA noted that the new
regulations do not affect the Memorandum of Agreement
reached between the EPA, USDA, Department of the Army
and the Department of the Interior but that agreement will
be reviewed by the four agencies.   61 Fed. Reg. 47019
(Sept. 6, 1996), amending 7 C.F.R. Part 12.
CROP INSURANCE. The FCIC has issued proposed
regulations amending the cotton crop insurance provisions
to require additional information necessary for determining
producer eligibility and the amounts to be paid for claims.
61 Fed. Reg. 46401 (Sept. 3, 1996).
FARM LOANS. The FSA has issued proposed
regulations governing administrative offset to collect
delinquent debts due under programs formerly administered
by the FmHA. 61 Fed. Reg. 45907 (Aug. 30, 1996).
PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
ACT-ALM § 10.05[2].* The petitioner was a licensed
wholesale produce dealer subject to PACA. The petitioner
purchased a shipment of berries which was inspected upon
delivery by the USDA which issued inspection certificates.
The petitioner thought that the berries were in poor
condition and sought a price reduction through the seller’s
agent. The agent requested copies of the inspection
certificates. The petitioner altered the temperature reading
on the certificates and faxed the altered certificates to the
agent who, based on the altered certificates, allowed a price
reduction. The ALJ imposed a 90 day suspension of the
petitioner’s license for willful, flagrant and repeated
violations of 7 U.S.C. § 499(b)(4). The petitioner argued on
appeal that PACA did not apply to this shipment of berries
because the berries were intended only for intrastate
commerce. The court upheld the ALJ ruling that PACA did
apply to the berries because the berries were part of the
petitioner’s interstate commerce business and some of
berries were sold to an interstate hotel chain. The petitioner
also argued that the altering was not a knowing
misrepresentation because the petitioner altered the
temperature reading because the petitioner believed that the
inspection method produced a false temperature. The
appellate court also upheld the ALJ’s ruling that the altering
of the certificate was a fraudulent action which the
petitioner willing and knowingly committed. Produce Place
v. U.S.D.A., 91 F.3d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
SHEEP. The APHIS has adopted as final regulations
removing the scrapie indemnification program which
provided financial compensation for owners of sheep
destroyed because of an infection of scrapie. 61 Fed. Reg.
47669 (Sept. 10, 1996).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
DISCLAIMERS-ALM § 5.02[6].* The decedent’s will
bequeathed the residuary estate in trust to the decedent’s
children for life with remainders to the grandchildren and
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further remainders to the great-grandchildren. The children
executed written disclaimers of any interest in the trust. The
grandchildren executed disclaimers of any interest in the
trust beyond $500,000. The great-grandchildren, through
court appointed guardians, executed disclaimers of any
interest in the trust. Because the trust did not provide for any
remainders after the great-grandchildren, the trust interests
in excess of $500,000 passed by the law of intestacy,
$50,000 to the surviving spouse and the remainder to the
children in fee. The IRS ruled that the disclaimers were
effective to pass the trust interests above $500,000 to the
children and surviving spouse. Ltr. Rul. 9638014, June 12,
1996.
GROSS ESTATE-ALM § 5.02.* The decedent had been
the subject of an action by the United States under
CERCLA. The decedent reached a settlement under which
the decedent’s residence was transferred to one trust which
provided the decedent with the use of the residence during
the decedent’s life, and the remainder of the decedent’s
property was transferred to a trust which provided for a
monthly annuity for the decedent plus so much of the
principal as necessary for the decedent’s maintenance,
property expenses and tax payments. The IRS ruled that the
trust property in both trusts was included in the decedent’s
estate with a deduction for the amount that passed to the
United States. Ltr. Rul. 9638036, June 24, 1996.
TRUSTEE LIABILITY FOR TAX. The taxpayer was
the trustee of a marital trust for the decedent. The decedent
exercised by will a power of appointment over the trust
corpus and appointed the trust corpus to the taxpayer’s
brother. The taxpayer received nothing from the decedent’s
estate. Although the brother was the estate executor, no
federal estate tax return was filed until the taxpayer filed the
return. An estate tax deficiency was assessed against the
estate and the taxpayer was assessed for that deficiency
under I.R.C. § 6324 as a trustee of the property in the estate.
The court held that the taxpayer had sufficient control over
the trust at the time of the decedent’s death to make the
estate tax payments; therefore, the taxpayer was liable for
the estate tax, even though the taxpayer received none of the
estate property. I.H. Govern Estate v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1996-434.
VALUATION. On the decedent’s death, the decedent
owned a 20 percent interest in a partnership which operated
a turpentine and lumber business which included timberland
in its assets. The decedent had actively participated in the
partnership business. The decedent’s will bequeathed the
partnership interest in trust and allowed the executor and
trustee to continue as partners in the business during the
administration of the estate and trust. The estate valued the
interest in the partnership as a “going concern” but the IRS
valued the interest using the values of the partnership
property and allowing a discount for a minority interest and
lack of marketability. The estate moved for summary
judgment on the valuation method issue, but the court held
that sufficient issues of fact remained as to the valuation to
deny summary judgment. McFarland v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1996-424.
The decedent died in July 1991 and the estate included
an undivided 50 percent community interest in 37 percent of
the stock of a corporation. The stock was not publicly traded
and was held by the members of three families. The
decedent had participated in a split gift of stock owned by
the decedent’s spouse in April 1991 and the issue in the case
was the value of the stock on the date of the gift and the date
of death. A little over a year after the death of the decedent,
all of the stock in the corporation was redeemed by the
corporation for $75 per share and the corporation was sold
to a third party at that price per share. The estate argued that
the redemption and sale price was irrelevant for determining
the date of death value but the court held that the sale price
was relevant because the sale was at arm’s length with an
unrelated party. The court adjusted the sales price by 30
percent for the time period elapsing after the date of death
and for the decedent’s minority interest to determine the
date of gift and date of death value of $50 per share. The
ruling is silent as to how the 30 percent discount figure was
reached, except to base it on the court’s “common sense,
knowledge and experience” because the record did not
provide any basis for the court’s determination. The
taxpayer filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the
court failed to apply the factors of Mandelbaum v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1995-255, aff’d, 91 F.3d 124 (3d Cir. 1996).
The court denied the motion, holding that the failure to
apply the Mandelbaum factors resulted from the taxpayer’s
own failure to provide sufficient evidence.  Scanlan v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-414, denying reconsid. of
T.C. Memo. 1996-331.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
ACCOUNTING METHOD-ALM § 4.01.*  The
taxpayer was a farm partnership which grew wine grapes.
The owners of the partnership also established another
company which produced wine from grapes purchased from
the partnership and other unrelated parties. The partnership
also sold grapes to other unrelated companies. The
partnership used the cash method of accounting but the IRS
argued that the partnership should be required to use the
accrual method because the winery company often was
allowed up to five years to make payments for grapes from
the partnership, thus causing a material distortion of income
for the partnership. The taxpayer argued that the deferral of
payments was in the ordinary course of business in that the
winery company needed a stable, long-term relationship
with a grape supplier. The evidence also demonstrated that
the winery deferred payment primarily because of cash flow
needs and borrowing needs while the winery was
expanding. The court held that the deferral of payments for
such long periods was not a standard industry practice,
especially where the grape supplier was not given any extra
consideration for the deferrals. The shared ownership of the
companies by the same persons also indicated that the
deferrals were part of a strategy to develop the winery at the
expense of the partnership. The court held that the deferral
of payments for the grapes was a material distortion of
income and not made in the ordinary course of business;
therefore, the partnership was required to use the accrual
method of accounting for income tax purposes. Oakcross
Vineyards, Ltd. v. United States, T.C. Memo. 1996-433.
BUSINESS EXPENSES. The taxpayer was employed
as a computer specialist in Florida and also owned a 300
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acre farm in Oklahoma inherited from the taxpayer’s
parents, although title to the farm remained in the deceased
mother’s name. The taxpayer planted crops on the land
during the tax years involved. The taxpayer did not keep a
separate checking account for the farm and claimed that all
of the farm suppliers required cash payments and all of the
crop purchasers paid in cash. The taxpayer claimed that the
cash income was not deposited in any personal accounts but
was used to make the cash payments to suppliers and for
other farm expenses. The taxpayer did not produce any
records to substantiate any of the expenses or income from
the farm. The court held that the deductions disallowed by
the IRS were properly disallowed for lack of substantiation
by the taxpayer. Haigh v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-409.
CASUALTY LOSS. The taxpayer suffered the loss of
an automobile caused by insufficient anti-freeze in the
engine. The court held that the loss was not a deductible
casualty loss but was a personal expense resulting from
personal neglect. Mohiuddin v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1996-422.
DEPRECIATION-ALM § 4.03[4].* The taxpayer was a
corporation which operated a horse racing and breeding
activity. On December 28, 1984, the taxpayer purchased the
assets of a decedent’s estate which included the stock of
another corporation and the personal assets of the estate.
The taxpayer continued the purchased corporation as a
subsidiary. On January 15, 1985, the taxpayer transferred
the estate personal property, which included 353 horses, to
the subsidiary retroactively, effective on the date the
property was purchased from the estate, December 28, 1984.
The taxpayer claimed a full year of depreciation for the
horses, arguing that the temporary ownership of the horses
gave the taxpayer a sufficient ownership interest to claim
depreciation. The court held that the true ownership of the
horses, as established by the taxpayer’s own actions, was
that the horses were owned by the subsidiary which was
entitled to only one month of deprecation in 1984. Jack
Kent Cooke, Inc. v. United States, 96-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,483 (E.D. Va. 1996).
GROSS INCOME. The taxpayer owned timberland and
signed an agreement with an unrelated party to log the land.
The other party paid the taxpayer $207,000 under the
contract before any logging commenced. The payment was
in the form of satisfaction of mortgages on the property. The
parties disputed the contract rights and the other party
eventually won a judgment in court which required the
taxpayer to repay the other party for loss of the timber
harvesting rights. The taxpayer did not include the $207,000
payment in income, arguing that the sale was not a
completed transaction because the actual timber to be cut
was not determined when the payment was made. The court
held that the sale was completed when the $207,000 was
paid because the actual trees to be cut was not an essential
element of the contract. The only remaining task under the
contract was to determine the value of the trees after they
were cut so that the parties would know when $207,000
worth of trees had been cut. In re Apsel, 96-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,490 (Bankr. D. Or. 1996).
HOBBY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[1].* The taxpayer was
employed as a pipe fitter for a railroad and owned a carpet
cleaning business. The taxpayer purchased three paint
horses with the intent to train the horses for competition and
to offer the horses for stud fees once the horses were
successful at the competitions. The taxpayer hired a
professional trainer and at least one horse was successful at
some competitions. However, in the second year of the
activity no horses were entered into competitions and no
breeding ever occurred. Records were kept for the horse
training and showing activities. The court held that the horse
training and breeding activity was operated with the intent
to make a profit, allowing deductions in excess of income
because (1) the taxpayer maintained separate records and a
separate checking account for the activity; (2) the taxpayer’s
lack of profit/loss analysis was not necessary given the
limited nature of the activity; (3) the taxpayer hired a
professional trainer who devoted a substantial amount of
time to the activity; (4) the taxpayer had a reasonable
expectation that the horses would appreciate in value after
they won competitions; (5) the taxpayer did not have
substantial income from other sources which was offset by
the horse activity; (6) the taxpayer had a reasonable
expectation of profits from the activity; (7) the losses were
incurred primarily during the start-up period when the
horses were being trained; (8) the taxpayer, or any member
of the taxpayer’s family, did not use the horses for personal
pleasure; and (9) the taxpayer’s lack of success in this and
another similar activity was outweighed by the other factors.
Dawson v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-417.
The taxpayers, husband and wife, were both employed
full time. The taxpayers purchased a vacation cottage three
blocks from the ocean and later purchased a lot across the
street which contained an uninhabitable house and a barn.
The taxpayers visited the properties nearly every weekend,
traveling 160 miles from their home in the city where they
worked. The taxpayers started a small flower and tree
nursery on the second property. Because the taxpayer could
commit only weekend efforts to the nursery, the nursery was
unable to generate sufficient income to cover all expenses
eligible for a deduction. The taxpayers claimed all expenses
associated with both properties as business expenses.
Although the taxpayers kept a journal of expenses
associated with the nursery, the taxpayers failed to provide
evidence of allocation of expenses common to both
properties, such as insurance and utility expenses. The court
noted that the taxpayers had no expertise as plant growers or
as retail business people and that the nursery had no
prospect of ever operating on a profit for tax purposes. The
court held that the taxpayers could not take deductions in
excess of the nursery income. Gagnon v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1996-430.
HOME OFFICE-ALM § 4.03[13].* The taxpayer
operated a scrap metal business which consisted primarily
of a rented warehouse. Scrap metal was delivered to the
warehouse where the taxpayer’s employees  sorted the metal
and prepared it for resale. Because the warehouse did not
have suitable office space, the taxpayer used a portion of the
taxpayer’s living and dining rooms in the residence for
regular office work. The office was not used to see
customers or clients. The taxpayer’s stationery gave the
warehouse as the business address. The court held that the
taxpayer was not entitled to deductions relating to the home
office because the primary business activity occurred at the
154                                                                                                                                                               Agricultural Law Digest
*Agricultural Law Manual (ALM). For information about ordering the Manual, see the last page of this issue.
warehouse and the taxpayer did not exclusively use the
office space for business uses. Miller v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1996-432.
INVOLUNTARY CONVERSIONS. The taxpayers
owned business property which was condemned by the state
for highway construction. The state placed a deposit with
the court on June 5, 1980 and the condemnation occurred on
June 16, 1980. The taxpayers withdrew the deposit on June
24, 1980 but did not include the funds in income on their
1980 income tax returns. The court held that the failure to
include the funds in income constituted an election to have
I.R.C. § 1033 apply to the transaction. The taxpayers
entered into negotiations with the state over the final amount
to be paid for the condemned land and final payment was
made in 1989, after which the taxpayers purchased
replacement property. The court held that the three year
period for purchasing replacement property commenced on
June 16, 1980, the date of the condemnation and when the
taxpayers first had the right to withdraw the funds. Because
the taxpayers did not purchase replacement property until
more than three years after the condemnation date, the entire
gain was reportable as realized. Thus, the deposit was
recognized as income in 1980 and the remainder recognized
in 1989. The entire condemnation award was gain because
the taxpayers failed to demonstrate any basis in the
condemned property. Wilson v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1996-418.
LOSSES-ALM § 4.03.* The taxpayer was an avid horse
rider and trained in the sport of equine dressage. The
taxpayer decided to breed a mare which the taxpayer had
trained in dressage. The foal was sold at 22 months of age,
long before any normal training would occur. The foal was
originally intended to be trained by the taxpayer but the
taxpayer determined that the taxpayer did not have
sufficient time to devote to the training. The taxpayer
claimed a long-term capital loss on the sale of the foal. The
court found that the taxpayer did not obtain the foal with an
intent to make a profit in that the taxpayer’s interest in
training the foal was primarily for personal pleasure. The
taxpayer had other employment and failed to develop a plan
by which the foal would be trained and eventually sold at a
profit. The court held that the loss from the sale of the foal
was not entitled to capital loss treatment. Cotner v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-428.
PENSION PLANS . For plans beginning in September
1996, the weighted average is 6.91 percent with the
permissible range of 6.22 to 7.46 percent (90 to 109 percent
permissable range) and 6.22 to 7.60 percent (90 to 110
percent permissable range) for purposes of determining the
full funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 96-
45, I.R.B. 1996-__, __.
The IRS has ruled that a defined contribution plan does
not satisfy the consent requirements of I.R.C. § 411(a)(11) if
(1) participants who have not terminated employment are
allowed to direct the investment of their accounts, (2) the
plan offers a broad range of investment choices, and (3) the
accounts of former employees who do not consent to an
immediate distribution of their account balances are
required to be invested in a money market fund. The IRS
ruled that the loss of the right to choose among a broad
range of investment alternatives is a significant detriment, as
defined by Treas. Reg. § 1.411(a)-11(c)(2)(i), for
participants who choose not to have immediate
distributions; therefore, such a plan permits an immediate
distribution without a valid consent. Rev. Rul. 96-47, I.R.B.
1996-__.
This ruling involved a qualified retirement plan which
permitted employees who have not satisfied the minimum
age and service requirements for participation to make
rollover contributions to the plan’s trust. The IRS ruled that
(1) the plan was not precluded from treating as excludible,
under I.R.C. § 410(b), all employees who have not
completed one year of service; (2) employees who are
eligible to make rollover contributions but who have not met
the one-year service requirements are not taken into account
under I.R.C. § 401(k)(3) or 401(m)(2); and (3) the plan must
separately satisfy the nondiscriminatory availability
requirement of Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(4)-1(b)(3) with
respect to the right of employees who have not satisfied the
minimum one-year of service requirement. The IRS also
ruled that, for the purposes of the minimum contribution and
benefit requirements of I.R.C. § 416(c), employees are not
plan participants for a plan year merely because the
employees are eligible for or make rollover contributions.
Rev. Rul. 96-48, I.R.B. 1996-__.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
October 1996
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 6.07 5.98 5.94 5.91
110% AFR 6.69 6.58 6.53 6.49
120% AFR 7.31 7.18 7.12 7.07
Mid-term
AFR 6.72 6.61 6.56 6.52
110% AFR 7.40 7.27 7.21 7.16
120% AFR 8.09 7.93 7.85 7.80
Long-term
AFR 7.13 7.01 6.95 6.91
110% AFR 7.86 7.71 7.64 7.59
120% AFR 8.59 8.41 8.32 8.27
SELF-EMPLOYMENT INCOME-ALM § 4.06.* The
taxpayer held a real estate license but primarily operated a
business as a photographer’s agent. In 1981, the taxpayer
purchased a single family residence with the intent to
remodel it and resell it at a profit, but the house was merely
rented after three months. In 1984, the taxpayer purchased a
second residential property, a duplex, with the intention of
renting one-half of the property until it could be sold at a
profit. The taxpayer lived in the other half. The taxpayer
sold the duplex and purchased another duplex under the
same arrangement. The taxpayer also married and the
couple continued to own the spouse’s pre-marital residence
which was rented. The taxpayer claimed losses from these
properties as business losses which decreased the taxpayer’s
self-employment income. The court held that the taxpayer
held the properties for investment and not as a dealer in real
estate; therefore, the losses from the properties were not part
of the calculation of self-employment income under I.R.C. §
1402(a)(1). Nadeau v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-427.
The taxpayers, husband and wife, owned and operated a
ranch as sole proprietors. The taxpayers transferred the
livestock and the farmstead to a new wholly-owned ranch
corporation which cash rented the remaining land from the
taxpayers. The corporation constructed a new house on the
farmstead in which the taxpayers lived. The taxpayers also
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rented the farm machinery to the corporation at a fixed
annual rental rate. The land not rented to the corporation
was enrolled in the federal Conservation Reserve Program
by the taxpayers. Both taxpayers were employees of the
corporation and operated the ranch business as before the
transfer. The taxpayers admitted that the wife’s duties
corresponded to the normal duties of a farm wife, including
bookkeeping, meal preparation and general assistance as
needed in the ranch operation. The husband was named as
president of the corporation, a member of the board of
directors and manager of the ranch operation in the
corporation bylaws and employment contracts. The IRS
ruled that the husband materially participated in the tenant’s
business activities. The IRS also ruled that the wife also
materially participated in the tenant’s business through her
position as secretary and treasurer, as member of the board
of directors and through involvement in the ranch operation.
The IRS ruled that both taxpayers actually participated in
the ranch operation of the corporation. The IRS ruled,
therefore, that the rental income from the corporation was
included in the taxpayers’ self-employment income under
I.R.C. § 1402(a)(1). The IRS noted that the fact that the
taxpayers also received salaries from the corporation and
that the rental payments were fixed did not affect the status
of the rental payments as self-employment income. The IRS
also held that, under Rev. Rul. 60-32, 1960-1 C.B. 23, the
CRP payments were included in self-employment income
because the taxpayers materially participated in the business
use of the land. Ltr. Rul. 9637004, May 1, 1996. The next
issue of the Digest will include an article by Neil Harl on
this ruling.
The taxpayers, husband and wife, operated a crop and
livestock farm. The taxpayers purchased an additional 1,022
acres of land in 1987 and 1989 which had previously been
placed in the federal Conservation Reserve Program. The
CRP contract required the maintenance of a ground cover
and prohibited the commercial use of the land for crops or
grazing. The taxpayer claimed the expenses of maintaining
the land, taxes, depreciation and other expenses as business
deductions and claimed the CRP payments as farm income
not subject to self-employment tax. The court held that
because the taxpayers were already engaged in the business
of farming and the CRP payments were contingent upon the
land being suitable for farming, the CRP payments were
included in self-employment income. The court cited Rev.
Rul. 60-32, 1960-1 C.B. 23 in support of its holding that
sufficient nexus existed between the CRP payments and the
taxpayers’ business of farming. Ray v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1996-436. An article by Neil Harl on this case will
be included in an upcoming issue of the Digest.
MEDICAID
ASSET TRANSFERS. Under the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, it is a criminal
offense punishable by a year in prison or a $10,000 fine to
transfer assets in order to qualify for Medicaid if done
“knowingly and willfully” to become eligible for assistance
if disposition of the assets results in a period of ineligibility.
Pub. L. No. 104-191, Sec. 217, amending 42 U.S.C. §
1320(a)-7b(a).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
ATTACHMENT. The debtors had granted a bank a
security interest in all crops growing or to be grown by the
debtors. The debtors had cash leased land to a corporation
owned by the debtors. The debtors lost the leased land by
foreclosure and the land was sold soon after the tenant
corporation planted a new wheat crop. The buyers of the
land harvested the crop and held the proceeds in escrow
pending the determination of the priority security interest in
the crop. The bank argued that its security interest in the
crops had priority because it was perfected first. The court
agreed as to the prior time of filing but held that the crops
were not covered by the security interest because the
debtor’s only interest was the rent charged for the land.
Janitell v. State Bank of Wiley, 919 P.2d 921 (Colo. App.
1996).
PERFECTION BY POSSESSION. The debtor had
granted a bank a security interest in all present and after-
acquired inventory. The debtor had subsequently purchased
an interest in cattle held by a feedlot business. The
agreement provided that the feedlot retained a security
interest in the cattle to secure the cost of purchasing the
cattle. The feedlot did not file a financing statement but the
cattle never left the feedlot. After the debtor filed for
bankruptcy, the trustee sought a determination as to the
priority of the security interests as to the cattle in the
possession of the feedlot. Under Kan. U.C.C. § 9-312(3), a
purchase money security interest has priority over prior
security interests if the purchase money security interest is
perfected when the debtor receives possession of the
collateral and the holder of the purchase money security
interest notifies the other security interest holder within five
years before the debtor receives possession of the collateral.
The court held that because the debtor never had possession
of the collateral and the purchase money security interest
was perfected by possession of the purchase money security
interest holder, notification of the other security interest
holder was not necessary to perfect the purchase money
security interest. The bank also argued that the cattle were
not in the possession of the feedlot for perfection purposes
but to feed and care for the cattle; therefore the possession
exception did not apply. The court held that the cattle were
held under the agreement which stated that the cattle were
security for the price of the cattle; therefore, one of the
purposes of the possession was for security for the cost of
the cattle. The court noted that the facts also indicated that
the debtor may not have acquired enough rights in the cattle
for the bank’s security interest to attach, since the debtor did
not have sufficient control over the care or selling of the
cattle. Kunkel v. Sprague Nat’l Bank, 198 B.R. 734 (D.
Minn. 1996).
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TRESPASS
ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION. The plaintiff
sought to sell several parcels of farm land but the sale fell
through when the potential buyer learned that a gasoline
spill had occurred on neighboring land and there was a
chance some of the plaintiff’s land was contaminated. The
plaintiff did not test the land and one report issued to the
neighboring land owner found that the contamination
spread away from the plaintiff’s land. The plaintiff filed
suit against the neighboring landowner and business which
caused the spill under theories of trespass and nuisance.
However, the petition contained no allegations that the
plaintiff’s land was contaminated but used only
hypothetical allegations. The court held that, although
hypothetical pleadings were allowed in certain
circumstances, the plaintiff’s petition should be dismissed
because the plaintiff had the power and time to test for
contamination. Sprague Farms, Inc. v. Providian Corp.,
929 F. Supp. 1125 (C.D. Ill. 1996).
CITATION UPDATES
Perry v. Comm’r, 91 F.3d 82 (9th Cir. 1996) (sale of
residence) see p. 130 supra.
AGRICULTURAL LAW PRESS
ON THE WEB
http://members.aol.com/aglaw/agpub
Check out our internet site for information about:
• Agricultural Law Manual, by Neil E. Harl, a
comprehensive, annotated looseleaf deskbook.
• Principles of Agricultural Law, a college textbook, by
Roger A. McEowen and Neil E. Harl, due for publication in
December 1996.
• Seminar in Paradise, “Farm Estate and Business
Planning,” by Neil E. Harl in Hawaii, January 6-10, 1997.
• Direct internet links to legal resources on the internet.
• Direct email link to the Agricultural Law Press.
We welcome any suggestions for improving our web
site.
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